The rent-seeking behavior of domestic and foreign investors of the telecommunications sector was considered and analyzed. A game-theoretic model determining the behavior of investors was developed. Comparative results for three or more investors were obtained. A situation with two Russian and one foreign investor of the telecom sector of the Russian Federation was examined in detail. The purpose of this article is to find the conditions that minimize the loss in public welfare from the rent-oriented behavior of Russian and foreign investors involved in the development of the Russian telecom industry. Game-theoretic models of rent-seeking behavior under complete and incomplete information in the struggle for rent were constructed. The model of rent-seeking behavior, when all of the players are not indifferent about who will get the prize if they do not receive it themselves, was proposed. The model is analyzed in cases of identical and different estimates of the rent by the players. The formulae for total equilibrium costs of the rent-seeking behavior as well as the individual equilibrium costs for each of the domestic and foreign firms under identical and different estimates of the rent were obtained. The following conclusions were drawn as a result of implementing the model: if the members of each group improved the assessment of the gain of the other members within the group, the total costs of the group will decrease; the contribution of a member of a group with common interests will decrease if the value attributed to the gain of the other group member increases; as the number of players in a group increases the likelihood that the group will win also rises. On the other hand a greater number of players with common interests mean a greater likelihood for so called «free riders» to emerge. An example with three investor players within the Russian telecommunications industry was considered. The first and the second player are Russian companies, and the third player, Intel, is a foreign one.