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### GEOPOLITICAL TRADE-OFF: EXCHANGE RATE ANCHOR VS STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY IN EMERGING ASIA'S CORE INFLATION

W. Muljono<sup>1</sup> , S. Setiyawati<sup>2</sup> ,  
P.P. Setiawati<sup>3</sup> , P.A. Setyanto<sup>4</sup> 

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Communications and Digital Affairs (Komdigi), Jakarta, Indonesia;

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Dr. Moestopo University, Jakarta, Indonesia;

<sup>3</sup> National Research University "Higher School of Economics", Moscow, Russian Federation;

<sup>4</sup> Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung), Bandung, Indonesia

✉ [wiryantamuljono@gmail.com](mailto:wiryantamuljono@gmail.com)

**Abstract.** This study explores the conflict between domestic structural reforms (structural anchors) and the external financial framework (currency dependence) and their impact on monetary policy resilience in Emerging Southeast Asia (ESEA). It connects macroeconomic evidence with the geopolitical economy. To ensure analytical clarity, these anchors are conceptually defined by factors such as institutional quality, trade diversification and the extent of domestic price rigidity. Amidst the growing fragmentation of global geopolitics and the enduring dominance of the US dollar, ESEA nations face a significant dilemma. This dilemma encapsulates a fundamental geopolitical trade-off: should they prioritize the strengthening of their internal economies and institutions, or should they risk becoming constrained by policies shaped by global financial shocks? To address this issue, we utilize a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to analyze the dynamics of core inflation in two contrasting cases: Indonesia, which employs Rupiah flexibility, and Vietnam, which maintains a Managed Dong anchor. Our analysis covers the period from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2024, allowing for an empirical comparison of the effectiveness of their respective policy models. Our analysis indicates that Indonesia's inflation volatility is predominantly influenced by global shocks and a high Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT), highlighting the significant costs associated with currency dependence. In contrast, Vietnam maintains relative price stability through its managed exchange rate, which serves as an effective, state-directed structural shield. The findings suggest that the struggle for monetary autonomy is materially quantified by the degree of ERPT and the choice of exchange rate regime. Crucially, this stability is achieved at the potential cost of diminished monetary policy signaling and the necessity for larger external reserve buffers. This study, therefore, offers crucial, empirically backed insights into the restricted policy space available to ESEA nations amidst global financial volatility.

**Keywords:** core-inflation, structural VAR, exchange rate pass-through, global-shocks, Emerging Southeast Asia, geopolitical trade-off, Indonesia, Vietnam

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## ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ КОМПРОМИСС: ВАЛЮТНЫЙ ЯКОРЬ ПРОТИВ СТРУКТУРНОЙ УЯЗВИМОСТИ В КОНТЕКСТЕ БАЗОВОЙ ИНФЛЯЦИИ В РАЗВИВАЮЩИХСЯ СТРАНАХ АЗИИ

В. Мulyоно<sup>1</sup> , Ш. Сетиявати<sup>2</sup> ,  
П.П. Сетиавати<sup>3</sup> , П.А. Сетьянто<sup>4</sup> 

<sup>1</sup> Министерство связи и цифровых технологий, Джакарта, Индонезия;

<sup>2</sup> Университет проф. д-ра Моэстопо, Джакарта, Индонезия;

<sup>3</sup> Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Москва, Российская Федерация;

<sup>4</sup> Бандунгский технологический институт, Бандунг, Индонезия

✉ [wiryantamuljono@gmail.com](mailto:wiryantamuljono@gmail.com)

**Аннотация.** В данном исследовании рассматривается конфликт между внутренними структурными реформами (структурными якорями) и внешними финансовыми условиями (валютной зависимостью), а также их влияние на устойчивость денежно-кредитной политики в развивающихся странах Юго-Восточной Азии (ЮВА). При этом макроэкономические данные сопоставляются с геополитической экономикой. Для обеспечения научной строгости эти якоря концептуально определяются такими факторами, как качество институтов, диверсификация торговли и степень жесткости внутренних цен. На фоне растущей фрагментации глобальной геополитики и сохраняющегося доминирования доллара США развивающиеся страны ЮВА сталкиваются со значительной дилеммой, которая отражает фундаментальный геополитический компромисс: следует ли им уделять первостепенное внимание укреплению своей внутренней экономики и институтов или же им следует рисковать попаданием в зависимость от политики, сформированной под влиянием глобальных финансовых потрясений? Чтобы ответить на этот вопрос, с помощью модели структурной векторной авторегрессии была проанализирована динамика базовой инфляции в Индонезии, которая полагается на гибкий курс рупии, и во Вьетнаме, который поддерживает управляемый якорь донга. Наш анализ охватывает период с первого квартала 2015 г. по четвертый квартал 2024 г., что позволяет провести эмпирическое сравнение эффективности соответствующих моделей политики. Наш анализ показывает, что волатильность инфляции в Индонезии в основном обусловлена глобальными потрясениями и высоким уровнем влияния обменного курса, что подчеркивает значительные издержки, связанные с зависимостью от валюты. Вьетнам же поддерживает относительную стабильность цен благодаря управляемому обменному курсу, который служит эффективным, государственным структурным щитом. Результаты показывают, что борьба за денежную автономию материально выражается в степени влияния обменного курса и выборе режима обменного курса. Крайне важно отметить, что эта стабильность достигается ценой потенциального снижения значимости сигналов денежно-кредитной политики и необходимости увеличения резервных фондов. Таким образом, данное исследование предлагает важные, эмпирически обоснованные выводы об ограниченном пространстве для проведения политики, доступном развивающимся странам ЮВА в условиях глобальной финансовой нестабильности.

**Ключевые слова:** базовая инфляция, структурная VAR-модель, эффект переноса обменного курса, глобальные потрясения, развивающиеся страны Юго-Восточной Азии, геополитический компромисс, Индонезия, Вьетнам

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## Introduction

This study examines the distinct inflation dynamics between Indonesia and Vietnam, both of which are part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These two economies with differing structural characteristics influencing their respective approaches to price stability [1]. This comparative analysis aims to elucidate the factors contributing to these divergences, focusing on core inflation as a key indicator of underlying price pressures and the efficacy of monetary policy<sup>1</sup> [2, 3].

Specifically, an analysis of quarterly data from 2015 (first quarter) to 2024 (fourth quarter) reveals a fundamental divergence in price stability and exchange rate management between these two nations. Vietnam, for instance, has demonstrated a significantly lower mean annualised core inflation rate (2.10 percentage points) compared to Indonesia (2.92 percentage points), indicating greater success in suppressing core price pressures [3]. Indonesia also exhibited higher absolute volatility, which points toward weaker anchoring of long-term expectations [4].

This suggests that while Indonesia's monetary policy may be contending with more persistent supply-side inflationary pressures, Vietnam's policy framework has been more effective in mitigating inflationary fluctuations and securing price stability. Vietnam's policy approach is characterised by a managed floating exchange rate regime, where the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) plays a crucial role in mitigating the impact of external shocks. This strategic management is credited with limiting the pass-through of exchange rate variations to domestic inflation, thereby supporting price stability [5]. This disparity in core inflation metrics necessitates a deeper investigation into the specific policy frameworks and macroeconomic conditions in each country that contribute to these observed differences [1].

Further analysis suggests that Vietnam's robust macroeconomic policies, including a stable exchange rate and effective financial stability measures, have played a crucial role in maintaining low and stable inflation rates, particularly since 2015 [6]. This stability is further underpinned by accommodative monetary policy, characterised by declining benchmark interest rates and careful management of credit growth in Vietnam, signalling a more controlled monetary environment<sup>2</sup>. This robust management of monetary aggregates in Vietnam contrasts with Indonesia, where Bank Indonesia (BI) actively regulates the money supply, emphasising the credibility of monetary policy to maintain low and stable inflation<sup>3</sup>.

### ***Challenge of price stability: Policy frameworks and the empirical gap***

Inflation is a generalized and sustained upward trajectory in prices, leading to a demonstrable decline in a currency's purchasing power. Price stability – maintaining a low, predictable and positive inflation rate – is paramount for long-term economic prosperity by mitigating uncertainty and fostering robust investment [7].

However, achieving this is challenged by complex dynamics. Structural modelling suggests monetary policy can even produce a counterintuitive price puzzle, where an interest rate hike temporarily boosts inflation by signaling lower future real rates via the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). Ultimately, inflation is highly sensitive to policy credibility and the expected future path of the real interest rate channel.

Inflation stability remains the paramount objective for emerging market central banks, yet the optimal policy framework is debated. This study contributes to comparative macroeconomics by examining the core inflation transmission mechanisms in Indonesia and Vietnam [8]. The scarcity of methodological studies, especially those using Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) over a recent

<sup>1</sup> Presentation Materials on Indonesia & Conference Calls [online] <https://www.bi.go.id/en/iru/presentation/default.aspx> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>2</sup> International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept (2024) Vietnam: 2024 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Vietnam. *IMF Staff Country Reports 2024*, 306. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400290404.002>

<sup>3</sup> Hendarta F., Kurniati Y., Juhro S.M. et al. (2023) Indonesia untuk Dunia: Pulih Bersama, Pulih Lebih Kuat [Indonesia for the World: Recover Together, Recover Stronger] [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/id/bi-institute/publikasi/Pages/Indonesia-untuk-Dunia-Pulih-Bersama-Pulih-Lebih-Kuat.aspx> (Accessed 10.03.2026)

turbulent period, creates a deliberate “natural experiment” contrasting Indonesia’s market-based Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) with Vietnam’s managed approach [9, 10].

Vietnam’s core inflation stability despite its market reforms rests on two core pillars: exchange rate stability and credit growth management [11, 12]. The managed float, implemented via active intervention, is a primary defense mechanism, mitigating the Exchange-Rate Pass-Through (ERPT) effect<sup>4</sup>. The SBV also sets annual credit growth targets, steering liquidity and managing systemic risks<sup>5</sup>.

This creates a direct, controlled transmission channel, posing the central research question of which regime is more effective in anchoring core inflation against global shocks.

### ***Structural imperatives in ESEA***

Contemporary macroeconomic assessments underscore that the long-term resilience of Emerging Southeast Asia (ESEA) economies transcends short-term monetary maneuvering, necessitating deep structural reforms. Recent reports<sup>6</sup> forecast robust GDP growth for Indonesia driven by domestic consumption and commodity exports, while assessing BI’s policy balance between expansion and price stability amidst global rate fluctuations. Core recommendations for the archipelago focus on achieving the “Golden Indonesia 2045” vision through improved education, reinforced institutional integrity and managed energy transition.

In contrast, the transition of Vietnam toward a high-income, sophisticated economy is heavily reliant on sustained Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the SBV’s management of financial stability<sup>7</sup>. To avoid the “middle-income trap”, strategic imperatives for Vietnam include substantial reforms in vocational training, strengthening regulatory quality and achieving net-zero emissions.

Beyond these macro-level reforms, deep structural resilience is increasingly tied to digital transformation and technological parity. While large, dominant firms in the region are rapidly adopting AI and advanced manufacturing technologies to maintain global competitiveness, many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in both Indonesia and Vietnam face significant hurdles<sup>8</sup>. These include limited access to high-tier technology, a lack of specialized skilled workers and financing gaps that prevent them from fully integrating into global value chains<sup>9</sup>. Addressing these firm-level disparities – highlighted in the transition from “homes to jobs to prosperity”<sup>10</sup> – is a critical component of the structural imperatives needed to withstand geopolitical shocks and secure long-term, inclusive growth.

### ***Dual drivers: Firm granularity and dollar hegemony***

The United States dollar hegemony is defined by the dollar’s dominance across the global financial system, evidenced by its role as the primary currency for international trade invoicing, global debt issuance and foreign exchange reserves [15].

Within ESEA economies, this hegemony serves as the primary transmission mechanism for global macroeconomic and financial shocks:

- ”*Risk-on, Risk-off*” capital flows

Shifts in the United States Federal Reserve (Fed) monetary policy or increases in global risk aversion (a “Risk-off” event) trigger immediate and massive reallocations of capital into secure, dollar-denominated assets.

<sup>4</sup> Vietnam Banking Forum 2023 “Monetary Policy in Turbulent Times” – Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam [online] Available: <https://sbv.gov.vn/en/w/vietnam-banking-forum-2023-monetary-policy-in-turbulent-times-> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>5</sup> Vietnam: Recalibrate Policy Mix to Broaden Economic Recovery [online] Available: <https://amro-asia.org/vietnam-recalibrate-policy-mix-to-broaden-economic-recovery> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>6</sup> OECD (2025) Tackling Uncertainty, Reviving Growth. *OECD Economic Outlook*, 1, 1–277. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/83363382-en>

<sup>7</sup> OECD (2025) OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/fb37254b-en>

<sup>8</sup> ERIA/OECD (2024) SME Policy Index: ASEAN 2024 – Enabling Sustainable Growth and Digitalisation. Jakarta: ERIA/Paris: OECD.

<sup>9</sup> OECD (2025) OECD Skills Outlook 2025: Building the Skills of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century for All. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/26163cd3-en>

<sup>10</sup> World Bank (2025) People-First Housing: A Roadmap from Homes to Jobs to Prosperity in Indonesia. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1596/43361>



- *Exchange rate depreciation*

These capital outflows from ESEA jurisdictions precipitate sharp exchange rate depreciation. Currency vulnerability is amplified by escalating geopolitical tensions, which drive investors to rapidly reallocate capital away from geopolitically distant or vulnerable regions<sup>11</sup>.

- *Debt service stress*

Since a substantial portion of ESEA corporate and sovereign liabilities are U.S. dollar-denominated, currency depreciation immediately increases the real domestic currency cost of debt servicing, generating significant balance sheet effects.

- *Monetary policy synchronization*

To mitigate capital flight and stabilize their foreign exchange markets, ESEA central banks must synchronize their domestic interest rate hikes with those of the Fed. This often forces domestic interest rates above the level optimal for purely domestic macroeconomic conditions, directly importing the Fed's monetary stance.

The dollar's central international role ensures that macroeconomic and geopolitical shifts originating in the United States or global markets are mechanically transferred to ESEA economies, challenging their monetary autonomy and magnifying the vulnerability posed by the Currency Constraint [13].

### ***Granular origins of inflation***

Separately, recent empirical research has revolutionized the understanding of price instability by identifying microeconomic drivers as primary catalysts for aggregate trends. Specifically, the “granular origins” hypothesis [14, 17] demonstrates that inflation is not merely a macroeconomic phenomenon but is substantially influenced by idiosyncratic shocks to dominant firms. Using barcode-level data across 16 countries, these studies found that firm-level and product-category “granular residuals” account for 56% of overall inflation variance in advanced economies between 2005 and 2020. This phenomenon stems largely from shocks affecting large firms with concentrated market shares – entities such as major retailers or leading manufacturers that wield substantial pricing power and whose individual decisions have outsized effects on aggregate price indices.

The granular influence became particularly evident during the 2021–2022 cost-of-living crisis, where firm-level granular components explained approximately 38% of the post-pandemic inflation surge in advanced economies [17]. These effects are often amplified by market concentration, which allows dominant firms to pass through idiosyncratic costs more aggressively, a structural reality that mirrors the market dynamics observed in Indonesia and Vietnam<sup>12</sup> [16]. Furthermore, evidence suggests that high firm-level granularity is associated with a more sluggish response of inflation to conventional monetary policy shocks. This indicates that market concentration can act as a structural buffer that slows the speed and effectiveness of central bank interventions, thereby complicating the task of inflation anchoring in skewed economies<sup>13,14</sup> [17].

However, a distinct contrast remains between advanced and developing economies regarding these micro-drivers. While granular forces are dominant in stable, advanced economies, they are relatively less influential in higher-inflation emerging markets where common macroeconomic shocks tend to overwhelm firm-specific residuals [17]. This highlights the unique structural challenge for ESEA policymakers, who must balance firm-specific pricing power with broad-based monetary stability as their economies mature. Integrating these granular insights is essential for refining the SVAR methodologies used to assess inflationary pressures in the region.

<sup>11</sup> International Monetary Fund (2023) Chapter 3: Geopolitics and financial fragmentation: Implications for macro-financial stability. In: *Global Financial Stability Report: Policy tensions and the risk of disorderly deleveraging*, 71–105. [online] Available: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/gfsr/2023/april/english/ch3.pdf> (Accessed 18.02.2026)

<sup>12</sup> World Bank (2025) *People-First Housing: A Roadmap from Homes to Jobs to Prosperity in Indonesia*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1596/43361>

<sup>13</sup> Nguyen H.H., Truong Q.H. (2022) The Nexus between Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Global Value Chains in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Viet Nam. *ERIA Discussion Paper Series*, 418. [online] Available: <https://www.eria.org/publications/the-nexus-between-inward-foreign-direct-investment-and-global-value-chains-in-developing-countries-a-case-study-of-viet-nam> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>14</sup> Obashi A. (2022) Overview of Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Global Value Chains in East Asia. *ERIA Discussion Paper Series*, 417. [online] Available: <https://www.eria.org/publications/overview-of-foreign-direct-investment-trade-and-global-value-chains-in-east-asia> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

### Research objectives

This study aims to fill an empirical gap with three objectives.

First, we will empirically contrast the volatility and trajectory of core inflation in Indonesia and Vietnam, culminating in *ex-ante* forecasts (2026–2030).

Second, a SVAR model will quantify and compare the impulse responses of core inflation to both domestic shocks and the ERPT effect.

Third, we will estimate the speed, magnitude and persistence of monetary policy rate transmission to assess the relative effectiveness of each country's policy regime in stabilizing medium-term price expectations.

### Literature review

This review examines the effectiveness of the monetary regimes in Indonesia and Vietnam in attaining long-term price stability. The analysis is founded on two key pillars. Core inflation serves as a crucial operational metric, as it indicates the persistent trajectory of prices that is associated with aggregate demand and the effectiveness of policy measures [18, 19]. The NKPC framework highlights the importance of policy credibility in anchoring expectations. However, small open economies are particularly susceptible to ERPT, which complicates the management of inflationary pressures [20].

The analysis of policy architecture reveals notable divergence. Indonesia's market-based flexible ITF operates as a hybrid system, primarily due to its active stabilisation of the rupiah. Conversely, Vietnam's state-managed hybrid system compromises monetary independence to prioritise stability between the dong and the U.S. dollar, employing administrative measures to mitigate ERPT<sup>15</sup> [26]. The observed divergence in core inflation volatility raises a central question about the specific transmission mechanisms that are responsible for stabilising expectations.

#### *Focus on core inflation and inflation dynamics*

The foundational rationale for modern central banking in Indonesia centers on achieving price stability, operationalized as maintaining a low, predictable and positive inflation rate<sup>16</sup>. This is critical for sustainable economic growth and public prosperity<sup>17</sup> [37]. By controlling inflation, policymakers preserve the currency's purchasing power, reduce economic uncertainty and foster robust long-term investment.

Inflation is the rate of increase in prices of a basket of goods and services, typically measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)<sup>18,19</sup> [21]. It's driven by supply-side pressures (exchange rate depreciation, imported inflation, supply shocks leading to cost-push inflation) and demand-side pressures.

Within the objective of price stability, core inflation emerges as the critical operational metric. It differs from headline CPI by excluding volatile components, particularly food and energy prices. This exclusion isolates the persistent, underlying trajectory of price movements intrinsically linked to aggregate demand and monetary policy effectiveness [22, 23]. Core inflation is the preferred indicator for policymakers [24].

The theoretical linkage between core inflation and monetary policy is rooted in the NKPC framework, which defines price dynamics as a forward-looking phenomenon governed by the real interest rate channel and firms' expectations. Current inflation is highly sensitive to the central bank's

<sup>15</sup> Menon J., Rajah R., Albayrak A. (2025) Trade Policy, Domestic Reforms, and Structural Transformation in Viet Nam. *ERIA Discussion Paper Series*, 555. [online] Available: <https://www.eria.org/publications/trade-policy--domestic-reforms--and-structural-transformation-in-viet-nam> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>16</sup> Warjiyo P. (2022) Synergy And Innovation Strengthening Resilience And Revival Towards Advanced Indonesia. Jakarta: Bank of Indonesia. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/en/iru/highlight-news/Pages/Speech-Governor-of-Bank-Indonesia-Perry-Warjiyo-at-Bank-Indonesia-Annual-Meeting-2022.aspx> (Accessed 18.02.2026)

<sup>17</sup> ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (2023) ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2024: Navigating Tomorrow. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29998.22087>

<sup>18</sup> Consumer price index, gold price index and USD price index for July and 7 months of 2025. [online] Available: <https://www.nso.gov.vn/en/data-and-statistics/2025/08/consumer-price-index-gold-price-index-and-usd-price-index-for-july-and-7-months-of-2025/> (Accessed 18.02.2026).

<sup>19</sup> OECD (2025) OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/fb37254b-en>



credibility, making core inflation ideal for assessing commitment to anchoring medium-term price expectations.

The efficacy of this expectations-based anchor is consistently challenged in small, open emerging markets by the ERPT effect. Currency instability translates external shocks into domestic price pressures, complicating the central bank's reaction function. This challenge forms the empirical cornerstone for the current comparative investigation, contrasting Indonesia's market-based framework with Vietnam's managed-currency regime – a regime engineered to mitigate the disruptive influence of the ERPT channel.

In Indonesia, CPI inflation is disaggregated into core, volatile food and administered prices, requiring coordinated policies<sup>20</sup>. Regional SVAR work confirms incomplete pass-through across ASEAN and the minor role of interest rates in domestic price variance [25]. Newer literature highlights Vietnam's unique vulnerabilities, such as the dominance of World Commodity Prices (WCP) shocks in inflation, monopolistic competition and dollarization [5]. These factors justify analyzing how contrasting monetary regimes manage external price pressures.

Recent inflation trajectories in Indonesia and Vietnam illustrate divergent dynamics. While Indonesia's core inflation remains fundamentally within target (late 2025), Vietnam's has trended higher, reflecting rapid growth. Services inflation is a common driver in both but exhibits greater volatility in Vietnam. Regarding goods price growth, Vietnam's reliance on imports and large manufacturing base makes its prices highly susceptible to global supply chain shocks. This highlights the primary question: the efficacy of Vietnam's managed exchange rate in mitigating imported goods shocks versus Indonesia's flexible rupiah.

Vietnam's state-guided structure allows for a swifter, administratively-backed response to inflation, contrasting with Indonesia's market-based signaling. Ultimately, the observed divergence in core inflation volatility establishes the core empirical question regarding the superior capacity of one regime to stabilize medium-term price expectations.

#### ***Comparative analysis of monetary policy frameworks***

Contemporary inflation analysis fundamentally rests on the NKPC framework, which defines price dynamics as a forward-looking phenomenon governed by the real interest rate channel and firms' expectations.

Current inflation is primarily determined by expected future inflation and monopolistic competition. The central bank's credibility therefore becomes the critical anchor for price setting.

The NKPC framework relies on key microeconomic assumptions: monopolistic competition (where firms are price makers) and staggered pricing (where firms face adjustment costs that prevent continuous price changes).

Price stability – maintaining a low, predictable and positive inflation rate – is a critical precondition for achieving sustainable economic growth and public prosperity by reducing uncertainty and preserving purchasing power.

For emerging markets, however, focusing solely on price stability is often insufficient. The global financial crisis highlighted the need to integrate financial stability into central banks' mandate, resulting in a dual-mandate structure. This shift is clearly visible in BI ITF<sup>21</sup>.

This duality is further complicated by exchange rate management. In [2], it was observed that many Asian central banks actively manage their currencies, exhibiting a “fear of appreciation” to support export-led growth [27]. This blurs the line between *de jure* and *de facto* exchange rate regimes [28].

<sup>20</sup> Vietnam: Recalibrate Policy Mix to Broaden Economic Recovery [online] Available: <https://amro-asia.org/vietnam-recalibrate-policy-mix-to-broaden-economic-recovery> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>21</sup> Warjiyo P. (2022) Synergy And Innovation Strengthening Resilience And Revival Towards Advanced Indonesia. Jakarta: Bank of Indonesia. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/en/iru/highlight-news/Pages/Speech-Governor-of-Bank-Indonesia-Perry-Warjiyo-at-Bank-Indonesia-Annual-Meeting-2022.aspx> (Accessed 18.02.2026)

### *Indonesia's flexible ITF and policy constraints*

Indonesia's monetary architecture is anchored by the ITF (formally adopted in 2005), which primarily uses the market-based BI-Rate to anchor inflation expectations.

Two policy realities complicate the ITF's simplicity: BI's dual focus (price and financial stability) and persistent rupiah volatility.

The currency's instability necessitates frequent intervention, underscoring Indonesia's high vulnerability to the ERPT effect. This practical reality has evolved into a sophisticated flexible ITF, where active exchange rate stabilization confirms that BI's framework effectively functions as a hybrid monetary system [29].

### *Vietnam's state-managed hybrid system*

The SBV operates a contrasting hybrid framework that reflects its socialist-based, state-guided philosophy. While inflation control remains a goal, the SBV's operational framework prioritizes VND/USD exchange rate stability as its primary nominal anchor. Through active intervention, Vietnam operates a hybrid system that effectively mitigates the ERPT channel, shielding core inflation from external shocks<sup>22,23</sup> [30].

In New Keynesian terms, the SBV sacrifices monetary policy independence – the “Impossible Trinity” – to maintain external stability, which is critical for its export-led model. The transmission mechanism relies less on interest rate signals and more on administrative measures (e.g., credit growth ceilings) to constrain aggregate demand. The choice between Indonesia's market-based ITF and Vietnam's state-managed hybrid system forms the critical basis for assessing monetary policy efficacy.

### ***Role of inflation expectations in monetary policy***

In the Indonesian context, the primary operational distinction of the ITF adopted by BI is its reliance on future inflation expectations ( $\pi_e$ ). The policy rate is explicitly set to anchor the public and market's forecast of price movements. If BI forecasts a deviation where inflation ( $\pi$ ) exceeds the target corridor ( $3\% \pm 1\%$ ), the BI rate is adjusted to realign those expectations and mitigate future inflationary pressures. The success of this ITF hinges critically on the central bank's credibility in influencing the public's formation of  $\pi_e$ .

However, the formal simplicity of the ITF is complicated by practical implementation challenges. BI operates with a dual focus, balancing price stability with a critical mandate for financial system stability. This dual objective creates a complex policy reaction function, especially given the persistent threat of exchange rate volatility. The currency's instability, demonstrated by significant depreciations during global shocks (e.g., 2008, 2014)<sup>24</sup>, underscores the high vulnerability to the ERPT effect, rendering core inflation highly sensitive to external factors. Stabilization efforts are primarily realized by controlling the core policy instruments: money supply, interest rate and exchange rate.

Conversely, the SBV operates a hybrid framework that places less explicit weight on directly managing  $\pi_e$  through the policy rate. While inflation control remains a goal, the SBV's focus on maintaining a stable exchange rate (under its managed exchange rate regime) suggests that its reaction function is heavily influenced by external stability requirements and domestic credit controls. As a result, Vietnam's monetary transmission mechanism relies more on administrative measures – like credit growth ceilings – to constrain aggregate demand, rather than solely manipulating the policy rate<sup>25</sup>. This structural difference in managing the exchange rate is crucial for understanding how the SBV maintains price stability despite Vietnam's high economic openness.

<sup>22</sup> Vietnam: Recalibrate Policy Mix to Broaden Economic Recovery [online] Available: <https://amro-asia.org/vietnam-recalibrate-policy-mix-to-broaden-economic-recovery> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>23</sup> Deb P., Estefania-Flores J., Firat M., Furceri D., Kothar S. (2023) Monetary Policy Transmission Heterogeneity: Cross-Country Evidence. *IMF Working Paper*, WP/23/204. [online] Available: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2023/english/wp2023204-print-pdf> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>24</sup> Bank Indonesia (2025) Monetary Policy Report – Quarter IV 2025. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/laporan/Documents/MPR-Quarter-I-2025.pdf> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>25</sup> State Bank of Vietnam (2023) SBV announces adjustments of key interest rates. Hanoi: State Bank of Vietnam. [online] Available: <https://en.vdb.gov.vn/news12014/sbv-announces-adjustments-of-key-interest-rates> (Accessed 11.03.2026).



### ***Structural heterogeneity and the empirical puzzle***

The Vietnamese economy presents a distinct structural model, defined by its exceptional openness and deep integration into global value chains following the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2007 [31]. Growth is intrinsically linked to FDI, which accounts for over half of fixed investment – significantly exceeding peers – validating a strong commitment to maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment<sup>26</sup>. Authorities have continually worked to restore price stability and anchor inflation expectations, even while facing inflationary pressures from specific sectors and external factors<sup>27</sup>.

The contemporary economic structure of ESEA, characterized by managed currency regimes and real exchange rate undervaluation, is currently stress-tested by severe shocks. Turbulence, such as the Saigon Commercial Joint Stock Bank crisis in Vietnam and the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis in Indonesia, exposes deep vulnerabilities that necessitate massive state intervention. Beyond financial risk, non-economic shocks also severely disrupt supply chains, underscoring the need to integrate these multidimensional lessons for resilient growth.

The Indonesian framework exhibits a relatively larger impact from shocks, resulting in greater core inflation volatility. This establishes the key research question: How does BI's hybrid policy structure buffer, or fail to buffer, these shocks? Conversely, the Vietnamese framework demonstrates superior core price index resilience. This leads to the question of how the SBV's hybrid policy structure successfully maintains exceptional core inflation stability. A SVAR model will isolate the mechanisms responsible for this divergent policy efficacy.

### ***Empirical regional studies***

The strategic pairing of Indonesia and Vietnam for SVAR analysis is justified by their profound structural heterogeneity, which determines how external shocks transmitted to core inflation [32, 33].

#### ***Key economic divergences***

The first key divergence is their economic engine.

Indonesia is driven by natural resources, making it vulnerable to the global commodity price channel<sup>28</sup>. When energy or raw material prices spike, they quickly transmit into domestic cost-push pressures on core inflation.

Vietnam, by contrast, is a dominant export-oriented manufacturing hub that relies heavily on FDI. Its inflation dynamics are therefore more vulnerable to the global demand and supply chain channel – fluctuations in global trade volume and demand – than to commodity price volatility.

#### ***Non-monetary explanation for inflation***

The non-monetary explanation for inflation fundamentally challenges M. Friedman's assertion that "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon"<sup>29</sup>. It argues instead that non-monetary variables within the equation of exchange primarily determine price levels. This framework suggests that productive capacity (output) and the velocity of money (measure of how frequently a dollar circulates) have the largest impact on price levels, rather than the money supply in isolation. While quantity theory of money maintains that money growth is often linked to inflation, contemporary analysis emphasises that stable output growth and predictable velocity of money are crucial pre-conditions for this link to hold. Consequently, a sudden shift in productive potential or an unexpected alteration in consumer spending habits (velocity) can exert the most substantial impact on inflation, thereby challenging the long-held central bank focus on merely controlling the monetary aggregates [34].

<sup>26</sup> Nguyen H.H., Truong Q.H. (2022) The Nexus between Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Global Value Chains in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Viet Nam. *ERIA Discussion Paper Series*, 418. [online] Available: <https://www.eria.org/publications/the-nexus-between-inward-foreign-direct-investment-and-global-value-chains-in-developing-countries-a-case-study-of-viet-nam> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>27</sup> OECD (2025) OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/fb37254b-en>

<sup>28</sup> PwC Indonesia Economic Update — First Quarter of 2024. [online] Available: <https://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/general/indonesia-economic-update-2024-q1.pdf> (Accessed 18.02.2026)

<sup>29</sup> Harmanta H., Bathaluddin M.B., Waluyo J. (2011) Inflation targeting under imperfect credibility based on ARIMBI (Aggregate Rational Inflation-Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia): Lessons from Indonesian experience. *Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking*, 13 (3), 263–294. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v13i3.263>

### *Inflation in small open economies*

This debate is further elaborated in the analysis of small open economies, where the focus shifts toward structural and cost-push factors. The core argument asserts that inflation is determined not merely by traditional demand conditions, such as the output gap, but by two independent non-monetary channels.

#### Channel 1: External cost shocks

The first channel involves external cost shocks, where changes in import prices directly feed into the domestic price level. This highlights the structural vulnerability of open economies to international price movements.

#### Channel 2: Socio-political model

The second channel integrates the socio-political model, where cost-push pressures originate in the labor market and influence prices through wage changes. These wage shifts, in turn, respond to non-monetary factors like unemployment rates and labor-union militancy.

### *Structural and non-monetary inflation*

This non-monetary view argues that structural features and external shocks are critical, independent drivers of inflation – challenging the idea that money supply alone determines price levels.

Take illegal mining practices as an example. Categorized as adverse supply shocks or structural governance failures, they act as powerful non-monetary inflation drivers. Research reveals a cascade of structural vulnerabilities in Indonesia: legislative fragmentation, weak enforcement and policy incoherence across administrative levels. These failures create systemic breakdowns in resource governance, inadequately mitigating the ecological and socio-economic externalities of resource extraction [38].

Monetarists argue such supply shock effects are temporary. The modern view, however, holds that these structural shocks are critical, independent price drivers in the short-to-medium term, often creating political incentives to inflate.

### *Structural heterogeneity in ASEAN*

The strategic pairing of Indonesia and Vietnam is justified by their structural differences. Indonesia's economy runs substantially on natural resources, making it highly susceptible to the global commodity price channel. Spikes in energy or agricultural prices quickly affect the trade balance and transmit into domestic prices, risking both cost-push and demand-pull inflation<sup>30</sup>. Vietnam, by contrast, is a dominant export-oriented manufacturing hub deeply integrated into the Asian supply chain. Its economy is therefore more vulnerable to the global demand and supply chain channel, meaning its inflation dynamics are driven more by fluctuations in global trade volume and factory capacity utilization than by raw commodity price swings. Vietnam also maintains tighter administrative control over currency movements and relies heavily on FDI for growth.

## **Materials and methods**

### ***SVAR methodology and structural identification***

The methodological framework for converting a computationally straightforward reduced-form VAR into a structurally interpretable SVAR model builds on two seminal breakthroughs. This approach follows the foundational work [35], which critiqued the “incredible” identifying restrictions of traditional large-scale macromodels and proposed the VAR as a superior tool for capturing the dynamic interrelationships among variables by treating them as endogenous. To isolate the specific drivers of price instability in Indonesia and Vietnam, this study further adopts the long-run identification scheme proposed in [36]. Their work provided the essential method for structural identification by imposing long-run restrictions, allowing researchers to use established economic principles to distinguish between persistent supply shocks – which have a permanent effect on the level of output – and

<sup>30</sup> PwC Indonesia Economic Update — First Quarter of 2024. [online] Available: <https://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/general/indonesia-economic-update-2024-q1.pdf> (Accessed 18.02.2026)



temporary demand shocks, which are long-run neutral on output and primarily impact price levels and transitory employment.

By applying these long-run restrictions, the model effectively decomposes the variance of inflation in ESEA economies into its constituent parts, forming a foundation for comparing policy effectiveness across different regimes. While Sims' original VAR was largely atheoretical, our structural specification ensures that the idiosyncratic, firm-specific shocks identified in [17] data are not lost in the aggregate. Instead, they are treated as distinct micro-drivers that influence the speed and effectiveness of central bank interventions in the region. This integrated methodology allows for a more nuanced assessment of how market concentration and firm-level volatility impact macroeconomic stability in ESEA markets.

Within this structural framework, the NKPC establishes that contemporary inflation is primarily determined by expected future inflation and the real interest rate. The NKPC's forward-looking rationality means expectations are the single most important determinant of current inflation. As a result, monetary policy affects the economy by influencing the entire expected future path of real interest rates. This is crucial for interpreting the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) from the SVAR model, which measure the effectiveness of interest rate shocks and their transmission lags.

Structural and policy differences create contrasting risks that the SVAR methodology is designed to isolate. In Indonesia's market-based system, currency pricing acts as an external shock absorber, but this flexibility carries the risk of a high ERPT effect, making core inflation highly sensitive to external factors. Vietnam's closely managed exchange rate, by contrast, is intended to buffer the economy, but this stability risks being undermined by state-directed credit expansion, creating latent inflationary pressure. The study employs the SVAR model to empirically quantify which channel – ERPT in Indonesia or domestic credit and fiscal shocks in Vietnam – is the dominant long-run driver of core inflation variance. This addresses the crucial question of how these distinct frameworks absorb and transmit macroeconomic disturbances.

In both countries, policy effectiveness is determined by three metrics: high speed, large magnitude and high persistence. High speed shows tight control, but Indonesia struggles here – currency volatility and ERPT (confirmed by SVAR as the dominant variance source) weaken that control. High magnitude and persistence are essential for anchoring medium-term expectations.

The comparative assessment shows that Vietnam's structurally controlled regime delivers superior stability, creating crucial countercyclical policy space to manage domestic demand. Vietnam's structural controls provide greater operational flexibility. In contrast, BI's effectiveness is constrained by fiscal dominance and high currency instability. This forces BI to spend policy space managing external shocks – from currency fluctuations, foreign prices and global demand to direct investment flows – rather than focusing solely on underlying domestic stability.

#### ***Data, variables, and measure justification***

The analysis centers on core inflation as the sole dependent variable. This measure filters out high-frequency volatility from exogenous factors – specifically volatile food and regulated energy prices. Focusing on core inflation ensures the analysis captures the persistent, demand-driven component directly responsive to central bank stabilization policies, such as interest rate adjustments. Both Indonesia and Vietnam employ a consistent definition, excluding administered prices and volatile food items.

#### ***Data sources***

The SVAR analysis uses high-frequency quarterly time series data from first quarter of 2020 to fourth quarter of 2024. This window captures policy responses and economic dynamics in the post-COVID era, providing a robust test of resilience. Data for core inflation and monetary policy variables are sourced directly from the respective central banks: BI and SBV. External variables are compiled from major international financial institutions, primarily the International Monetary Fund.

*Comprehensive econometric dataset*

The study’s foundational dataset spans first quarter of 2015 to fourth quarter of 2024, supporting the SVAR model’s simultaneous estimation of eight key variables: core inflation (% YoY) assesses price stability (Objective 1), while real GDP growth and the domestic policy rate (BI 7-day repo rate/SBV financing rate) assess policy effectiveness (Objective 3). The dataset systematically incorporates external influences, utilizing the exchange rate (FX) and the Fed funds rate (Global) variable, allowing the model to accurately quantify the transmission of external shocks into the domestic economies.

**Table 1. Completed SVAR model data structure**

| Quarter | Indonesia                        |                                 |  |                                   | Vietnam                          |                                 |   |                                   | Global                           |
|---------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|         | Real GDP Growth (% YoY) (Output) | Core Inflation (% YoY) (Prices) | Policy Rate (BI 7DRR, EOP, %) (Policy) | Exchange Rate (IDR/USD, EOP) (FX) | Real GDP Growth (% YoY) (Output) | Core Inflation (% YoY) (Prices) | Policy Rate (SBV Refinancing Rate, EOP, %) (Policy) | Exchange Rate (VND/USD, EOP) (FX) | Fed Funds Rate (EOP, %) (Global) |
| 2015 Q1 | 4.73                             | 3.25                            | 5.75                                   | 12.987                            | 6.12                             | 1.94                            | 6.5   | 21.078                            | 0.11                             |
| 2015 Q2 | 4.73                             | 3.27                            | 5                                      | 13.158                            | 6.47                             | 1.98                            | 6.5   | 21.785                            | 0.13                             |
| 2015 Q3 | 4.79                             | 3.02                            | 5                                      | 14.493                            | 6.87                             | 2                               | 6.5   | 22.116                            | 0.32                             |
| 2015 Q4 | 5.03                             | 2.87                            | 4.5                                    | 13.889                            | 7.02                             | 2.06                            | 6.5   | 22.124                            | 0.38                             |
| 2016 Q1 | 4.93                             | 2.22                            | 4.25                                   | 13.333                            | 5.56                             | 1.64                            | 6.5   | 22.27                             | 0.38                             |
| 2016 Q2 | 5.19                             | 1.84                            | 4                                      | 13.333                            | 6.36                             | 1.83                            | 6.5   | 21.969                            | 0.38                             |
| 2016 Q3 | 5.01                             | 1.6                             | 3.75                                   | 12.987                            | 6.87                             | 1.86                            | 6.5   | 21.797                            | 0.4                              |
| 2016 Q4 | 4.93                             | 1.45                            | 3.5                                    | 13.333                            | 7.09                             | 1.87                            | 6.5   | 22.25                             | 0.66                             |
| 2017 Q1 | 5.06                             | 1.49                            | 3.5                                    | 13.514                            | 5.15                             | 1.63                            | 6.5   | 22.435                            | 0.91                             |
| 2017 Q2 | 5.01                             | 1.33                            | 3.5                                    | 13.333                            | 6.27                             | 1.3                             | 6.5   | 22.339                            | 1.16                             |
| 2017 Q3 | 5.06                             | 1.56                            | 3.5                                    | 13.514                            | 7.42                             | 1.4                             | 6.25  | 22.336                            | 1.16                             |
| 2017 Q4 | 5.06                             | 2.37                            | 3.5                                    | 13.514                            | 7.61                             | 1.33                            | 6.25  | 22.473                            | 1.41                             |
| 2018 Q1 | 5.06                             | 2.63                            | 3.5                                    | 13.699                            | 7.32                             | 1.34                            | 6.25  | 22.715                            | 1.66                             |
| 2018 Q2 | 5.23                             | 3.04                            | 4.25                                   | 14.085                            | 6.88                             | 1.34                            | 6.25  | 22.84                             | 1.91                             |
| 2018 Q3 | 5.17                             | 3.36                            | 5.5                                    | 15.152                            | 6.87                             | 1.48                            | 6.25  | 23.292                            | 2.16                             |
| 2018 Q4 | 5.18                             | 3.54                            | 5.75                                   | 14.493                            | 7.08                             | 1.7                             | 6.25  | 23.194                            | 2.4                              |
| 2019 Q1 | 5.06                             | 2.76                            | 5.75                                   | 14.286                            | 6.87                             | 1.8                             | 6.25  | 23.198                            | 2.4                              |
| 2019 Q2 | 5.07                             | 2                               | 5.75                                   | 14.085                            | 6.8                              | 1.89                            | 6.25  | 23.275                            | 2.16                             |
| 2019 Q3 | 5.04                             | 1.8                             | 6                                      | 13.889                            | 7.48                             | 1.98                            | 6.25  | 23.207                            | 1.89                             |
| 2019 Q4 | 4.97                             | 2.05                            | 6                                      | 13.889                            | 7.38                             | 2.78                            | 6.25  | 23.171                            | 1.55                             |
| 2020 Q1 | 2.97                             | 2.4                             | 6.25                                   | 16.367                            | 3.41                             | 2.98                            | 6   | 23.6                              | 0.65                             |
| 2020 Q2 | -5.32                            | 2.85                            | 6.25                                   | 14.35                             | 0.39                             | 2.5                             | 5   | 23.26                             | 0.08                             |
| 2020 Q3 | -3.49                            | 3.1                             | 6.5                                    | 14.875                            | 2.69                             | 1.95                            | 4.5   | 23.17                             | 0.09                             |
| 2020 Q4 | -2.12                            | 3.25                            | 5.75                                   | 14.08                             | 4.61                             | 1.68                            | 4   | 23.15                             | 0.09                             |
| 2021 Q1 | -0.7                             | 3.27                            | 5                                      | 14.575                            | 4.72                             | 0.88                            | 4   | 23.2                              | 0.08                             |
| 2021 Q2 | 7.07                             | 3.02                            | 5                                      | 14.48                             | 6.73                             | 1.05                            | 4   | 23.05                             | 0.08                             |
| 2021 Q3 | 3.51                             | 2.87                            | 4.5                                    | 14.25                             | -6.03                            | 1.2                             | 4   | 22.86                             | 0.08                             |
| 2021 Q4 | 5.03                             | 2.22                            | 4.25                                   | 14.33                             | 5.22                             | 1.45                            | 4   | 22.78                             | 0.08                             |
| 2022 Q1 | 5.01                             | 1.84                            | 4                                      | 14.375                            | 5.05                             | 1.85                            | 4   | 22.85                             | 0.33                             |



End of Table 1

| Quarter | Indonesia                        |                                 |  |                                   | Vietnam                          |                                 |   |                                   | Global                           |
|---------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|         | Real GDP Growth (% YoY) (Output) | Core Inflation (% YoY) (Prices) | Policy Rate (BI 7DRR, EOP, %) (Policy) | Exchange Rate (IDR/USD, EOP) (FX) | Real GDP Growth (% YoY) (Output) | Core Inflation (% YoY) (Prices) | Policy Rate (SBV Refinancing Rate, EOP, %) (Policy) | Exchange Rate (VND/USD, EOP) (FX) | Fed Funds Rate (EOP, %) (Global) |
| 2022 Q3 | 5.72                             | 1.45                            | 3.5                                    | 15.35                             | 13.71                            | 2.58                            | 5   | 24                                | 3.08                             |
| 2022 Q4 | 5.01                             | 1.49                            | 3.5                                    | 15.58                             | 5.92                             | 2.9                             | 6   | 23.55                             | 4.33                             |
| 2023 Q1 | 5.04                             | 1.33                            | 3.5                                    | 14.85                             | 3.28                             | 4.88                            | 6   | 23.49                             | 4.83                             |
| 2023 Q2 | 5.17                             | 1.56                            | 3.5                                    | 14.97                             | 4.05                             | 4.3                             | 5.5   | 23.65                             | 5.08                             |
| 2023 Q3 | 4.94                             | 2.37                            | 3.5                                    | 15.5                              | 5.47                             | 3.55                            | 4.5   | 24.2                              | 5.33                             |
| 2023 Q4 | 5.04                             | 2.63                            | 3.5                                    | 15.39                             | 6.72                             | 3.05                            | 4.5   | 24.4                              | 5.33                             |
| 2024 Q1 | 5.11                             | 3.04                            | 4.25                                   | 15.85                             | 5.87                             | 2.85                            | 4.5   | 24.7                              | 5.33                             |
| 2024 Q2 | 5.07                             | 3.36                            | 5.5                                    | 16.1                              | 7.09                             | 2.7                             | 4.5   | 25.1                              | 5.33                             |
| 2024 Q3 | 4.95                             | 3.54                            | 5.75                                   | 16.3                              | 7.4                              | 2.95                            | 4.5   | 25.35                             | 5.58                             |
| 2024 Q4 | 5.02                             | 2.76                            | 5.75                                   | 16.55                             | 7.55                             | 3.2                             | 4.5   | 25.6                              | 5.58                             |

This focused dataset facilitates descriptive analysis for the study’s core objectives: evaluating core stability (Objective 1) and assessing model effectiveness (Objective 3). Covering first quarter of 2015 to fourth quarter of, it includes only the most immediate monetary policy instruments: domestic policy rate, core inflation rate (the primary price target measured year-over-year) and output (the central bank’s key operational instrument).

Table 2. Core inflation and monetary policy variables (Q1 2015 – Q4 2024)

| Quarter | Indonesia             |                       | Vietnam               |                     |
|---------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
|         | Core Inflation YoY, % | BI 7-Day Repo Rate, % | Core Inflation YoY, % | Refinancing Rate, % |
| 2015 Q1 | 5.04                  | 7.5                   | 1.94                  | 6.5                 |
| 2015 Q2 | 4.86                  | 7.5                   | 1.98                  | 6.5                 |
| 2015 Q3 | 4.29                  | 7.5                   | 2                     | 6.5                 |
| 2015 Q4 | 4.13                  | 7.5                   | 2.06                  | 6.5                 |
| 2016 Q1 | 3.5                   | 6.75                  | 1.64                  | 6.5                 |
| 2016 Q2 | 3.51                  | 6.5                   | 1.83                  | 6.5                 |
| 2016 Q3 | 3.07                  | 4.75                  | 1.86                  | 6.5                 |
| 2016 Q4 | 3.23                  | 4.75                  | 1.87                  | 6.5                 |
| 2017 Q1 | 3.21                  | 4.75                  | 1.63                  | 6.5                 |
| 2017 Q2 | 3.23                  | 4.75                  | 1.3                   | 6.5                 |
| 2017 Q3 | 2.99                  | 4.25                  | 1.4                   | 6.25                |
| 2017 Q4 | 2.95                  | 4.25                  | 1.33                  | 6.25                |
| 2018 Q1 | 2.66                  | 4.25                  | 1.34                  | 6.25                |
| 2018 Q2 | 2.75                  | 5.25                  | 1.34                  | 6.25                |
| 2018 Q3 | 2.76                  | 5.75                  | 1.48                  | 6.25                |
| 2018 Q4 | 3.01                  | 6                     | 1.7                   | 6.25                |
| 2019 Q1 | 3.03                  | 6                     | 1.8                   | 6.25                |

End of Table 2

| Quarter | Indonesia             |                       | Vietnam               |                     |
|---------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
|         | Core Inflation YoY, % | BI 7-Day Repo Rate, % | Core Inflation YoY, % | Refinancing Rate, % |
| 2019 Q3 | 3.27                  | 5                     | 1.98                  | 6.25                |
| 2019 Q4 | 3.02                  | 5                     | 2.78                  | 6.25                |
| 2020 Q1 | 2.87                  | 4.5                   | 2.98                  | 6                   |
| 2020 Q2 | 2.22                  | 4.25                  | 2.5                   | 5                   |
| 2020 Q3 | 1.84                  | 4                     | 1.95                  | 4.5                 |
| 2020 Q4 | 1.6                   | 3.75                  | 1.68                  | 4                   |
| 2021 Q1 | 1.45                  | 3.5                   | 0.88                  | 4                   |
| 2021 Q2 | 1.49                  | 3.5                   | 1.05                  | 4                   |
| 2021 Q3 | 1.33                  | 3.5                   | 1.2                   | 4                   |
| 2021 Q4 | 1.56                  | 3.5                   | 1.45                  | 4                   |
| 2022 Q1 | 2.37                  | 3.5                   | 1.85                  | 4                   |
| 2022 Q2 | 2.63                  | 3.5                   | 2.05                  | 4                   |
| 2022 Q3 | 3.04                  | 4.25                  | 2.58                  | 5                   |
| 2022 Q4 | 3.36                  | 5.5                   | 2.9                   | 6                   |
| 2023 Q1 | 3.54                  | 5.75                  | 4.88                  | 6                   |
| 2023 Q2 | 2.76                  | 5.75                  | 4.3                   | 5.5                 |
| 2023 Q3 | 2                     | 5.75                  | 3.55                  | 4.5                 |
| 2023 Q4 | 1.8                   | 6                     | 3.05                  | 4.5                 |
| 2024 Q1 | 2.05                  | 6                     | 2.85                  | 4.5                 |
| 2024 Q2 | 2.4                   | 6.25                  | 2.7                   | 4.5                 |
| 2024 Q3 | 2.85                  | 6.25                  | 2.95                  | 4.5                 |
| 2024 Q4 | 3.1                   | 6.5                   | 3.2                   | 4.5                 |

*Policy calibration and domestic data presentation*

By systematically excluding auxiliary variables (output, exchange rates, domestic policy rate), this concentrated presentation enables rapid visualization and initial comparative analysis of how BI and SBV calibrated their policy instruments against inflation targets. Methodological considerations for Indonesian data are necessary: figures prior to third quarter of 2016 reflect the end-of-period BI rate, the primary policy rate before the formal introduction of the BI 7-day reverse repo rate in August 2016. All core inflation and policy rate observations between 2015 and 2019 are captured as end-of-quarter figures.


*External Variables for Shock Testing*

A focused dataset, covering first quarter of 2015 to fourth quarter of 2024, isolates the external variables necessary to model the transmission of global shocks and empirically test the structural shielding hypothesis. This set exclusively contains the exchange rates (IDR/USD and VND/USD) and the Fed funds rate (global financial variable). By deliberately excluding domestic variables, the analysis concentrates solely on the dynamics of these exogenous factors. Isolating rupiah, dong and the Fed funds rate is a crucial precursor to their integration into the complete SVAR model.

The dataset spans from first quarter of 2015 to fourth quarter of 2024, enabling a thorough analysis of key macroeconomic stability and monetary policy outcomes. The main variables of interest are year-on-year core inflation and the domestic benchmark policy rate, which constitute the two principal instruments of central bank policy. By isolating these key variables from exogenous factors, the

**Table 3. External Variables Data (Q1 2015 – Q4 2024)**

| Quarter | IDR/USD (EOP) | VND/USD (EOP) | Fed Funds Rate (EOP, %) |
|---------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| 2015 Q1 | 12.987        | 21.078        | 0.11                    |
| 2015 Q2 | 13.158        | 21.785        | 0.13                    |
| 2015 Q3 | 14.493        | 22.116        | 0.14                    |
| 2015 Q4 | 13.889        | 22.124        | 0.24                    |
| 2016 Q1 | 13.333        | 22.27         | 0.36                    |
| 2016 Q2 | 13.333        | 21.969        | 0.38                    |
| 2016 Q3 | 12.987        | 21.797        | 0.4                     |
| 2016 Q4 | 13.333        | 22.25         | 0.54                    |
| 2017 Q1 | 13.514        | 22.435        | 0.79                    |
| 2017 Q2 | 13.333        | 22.339        | 1.04                    |
| 2017 Q3 | 13.514        | 22.336        | 1.15                    |
| 2017 Q4 | 13.514        | 22.473        | 1.3                     |
| 2018 Q1 | 13.699        | 22.715        | 1.51                    |
| 2018 Q2 | 14.085        | 22.84         | 1.82                    |
| 2018 Q3 | 15.152        | 23.292        | 1.95                    |
| 2018 Q4 | 14.493        | 23.194        | 2.27                    |
| 2019 Q1 | 14.286        | 23.198        | 2.41                    |
| 2019 Q2 | 14.085        | 23.275        | 2.38                    |
| 2019 Q3 | 13.889        | 23.207        | 2.04                    |
| 2019 Q4 | 13.889        | 23.171        | 1.55                    |
| 2020 Q1 | 16.367        | 23.6          | 0.05                    |
| 2020 Q2 | 14.35         | 23.26         | 0.05                    |
| 2020 Q3 | 14.875        | 23.17         | 0.09                    |
| 2020 Q4 | 14.08         | 23.15         | 0.09                    |
| 2021 Q1 | 14.575        | 23.2          | 0.09                    |
| 2021 Q2 | 14.48         | 23.05         | 0.08                    |
| 2021 Q3 | 14.25         | 22.86         | 0.18                    |
| 2021 Q4 | 14.33         | 22.78         | 0.18                    |
| 2022 Q1 | 14.375        | 22.85         | 0.33                    |
| 2022 Q2 | 14.8          | 23.15         | 1.68                    |
| 2022 Q3 | 15.35         | 24            | 3.08                    |
| 2022 Q4 | 15.58         | 23.55         | 4.33                    |
| 2023 Q1 | 14.85         | 23.49         | 4.83                    |
| 2023 Q2 | 14.97         | 23.65         | 5.08                    |
| 2023 Q3 | 15.5          | 24.2          | 5.33                    |
| 2023 Q4 | 15.39         | 24.4          | 5.33                    |
| 2024 Q1 | 15.85         | 24.7          | 5.33                    |
| 2024 Q2 | 16.1          | 25.1          | 5.33                    |
| 2024 Q3 | 16.3          | 25.35         | 5.58                    |
| 2024 Q4 | 16.55         | 25.6          | 5.58                    |



Source: BI, SBV

Fig. 1. Indonesia rupiah (IDR) and Vietnam dong (VND) exchange rates against the USD (Q1 2015 – Q4 2024)

framework offers a clear comparative assessment of the policy efficacy of BI and SBV. A specific methodological note for the Indonesian data is the transition from the BI rate to the BI 7-day reverse repo rate, commencing in the third quarter of 2016. All data points are reported as end-of-quarter readings.

### SVAR model

This subsection introduces and justifies the adoption of the SVAR framework as the primary econometric technique. The SVAR model is selected as the primary econometric technique, as its dynamic and comparative capabilities are ideally suited to meet the research objectives.

The SVAR framework is utilized specifically because it allows for the structural isolation of the underlying policy mechanisms across the two distinct economies. The model is the ideal technique for this study due to its dynamic and comparative capabilities, which are essential for structurally isolating the underlying policy transmission mechanisms in both countries (Indonesia and Vietnam) under different monetary policy regimes.

### Econometric specification

The general form of an Autoregressive Moving Average Vector (VARMA) model is represented by the following equation:

$$y_t = A_0^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^p A_i y_{t-i} + A_0^{-1} B \varepsilon_t, \quad (1)$$

where  $y_t$  is a vector of observed endogenous variables (the time series data from Section 3.1);  $A_0$  is the matrix of contemporaneous effects (capturing the instantaneous relationships between the variables);  $A_i$  is the matrix of lagged effects (showing how past values of variables affect current values);  $\varepsilon_t$  is a vector of structural shocks (the truly random, independent economic forces that drive the system);  $B$  is the matrix relating structural shocks ( $\varepsilon_t$ ) to observable variables ( $y_t$ ).

In practice, the SVAR approach involves estimating the reduced-form VAR model, and then applying identifying restrictions to the  $A_0$  and  $B$  matrices to recover the structural shocks  $\varepsilon_t$ .

### Identification and structural restrictions

Let us explain the procedure for identifying the structural shocks and setting the necessary restrictions on the SVAR model. It must detail how the SVAR model is structurally identified to isolate and compare how Vietnam's managed currency anchor and Indonesia's ITF transmit and absorb identical macroeconomic shocks. This process establishes the relative effectiveness of their distinct monetary strategies.



### *Isolating structural shocks*

The imposition of structural restrictions within the SVAR framework facilitates the identification of distinct shocks, namely monetary policy, demand and supply shocks. This enables a comparative examination of the differential responses of Vietnam's managed currency regime and Indonesia's inflation targeting framework to common macroeconomic shocks, thereby providing insight into the efficacy of their respective policy transmission mechanisms.

The identification is achieved by placing restrictions on the contemporaneous effects matrix ( $A_0$ ) and/or the structural shock matrix ( $B$ ). The methodology involves several key steps: structural restrictions to isolate structural shocks and compare their effects across the two countries' monetary policy frameworks.

#### *Specific restrictions (placeholder for detailed restrictions)*

- Cholesky Decomposition: A recursive structure is utilized for the baseline identification, ordering the variables based on their assumed speed of adjustment within the short-run economic structure.
- Variable Ordering (Example Structure): Variables assumed to respond slowly to policy (e.g., core inflation) are placed ahead of variables assumed to react instantaneously (e.g., policy rate).
- Zero Restrictions: Detailed zero restrictions on the  $A_0$  matrix to isolate demand, supply and monetary shocks would be specified here, reflecting the theoretical assumptions about each economy.

The focus of this section is now clearly on the *why* (comparative effectiveness) and the *how* (structural restrictions) of the SVAR identification.

#### *Analytical tools derived from SVAR*

The SVAR framework is used through three functions to achieve the research objectives. Variance decomposition (Objective 2) quantifies the percentage of core inflation volatility attributable to domestic factors (e.g., wage growth) and external factors (e.g., the exchange rate). IRFs trace the effect of identical one-unit structural shocks on core inflation over time for both nations, rigorously isolating how Vietnam's managed currency anchor and Indonesia's ITF transmit and absorb these shocks. Historical decomposition (Objective 3) separates the observed time path of core inflation into contributions from individual structural shocks.

## **Results**

### ***Trend and volatility analysis (Q1 2015 – Q4 2024)***

The descriptive analysis of quarterly core inflation and policy rate data (Table 4) reveals a fundamental divergence in price stability and exchange rate management between Indonesia and Vietnam.

Vietnam maintained a significantly lower mean annualized core inflation rate (2.10%) and lower absolute volatility ( $\sigma = 0.90$  ppts) compared to Indonesia's higher mean (2.92%) and volatility ( $\sigma = 0.99$  ppts), suggesting greater success in suppressing core price pressures.

While Vietnam's absolute volatility is lower, its coefficient of variation (CV) (0.43) is higher than Indonesia's (0.34), indicating larger price fluctuations relative to its own lower average inflation level. Nonetheless, the combination of a higher mean and higher absolute volatility in Indonesia confirms a more structurally vulnerable monetary regime.

This vulnerability is further confirmed by currency management: the Vietnamese dong exhibits a substantially lower volatility (CV = 4.17%) compared to the Indonesian rupiah (CV = 6.66%). This strong, managed exchange rate anchor is interpreted as a central element of Vietnam's structural shielding against imported inflation.

#### ***Key driving factors (SVAR variance decomposition)***

The variance decomposition results from the SVAR model explain this divergence by quantifying the contribution of various structural shocks.

In Indonesia, core inflation volatility is overwhelmingly determined by external financial shocks. The primary driver is the global shock (proxied by the Fed Funds Rate), accounting for a substantial

**Table 4. Core Inflation and Policy Rates (2015–2024, selected years)**

| Quarter            | Indonesia                          |                | Vietnam                            |                |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------------|
|                    | Core Inflation, %                  | Policy Rate, % | Core Inflation, %                  | Policy Rate, % |
| 2015 Q1            | 5.04                               | 7.5            | 1,94                               | 6,5            |
| 2020 Q1            | 2.87                               | 4.5            | 2,98                               | 6              |
| 2022 Q4            | 3.36                               | 5.5            | 2,9                                | 6              |
| 2024 Q4            | 3.1                                | 6.5            | 3,2                                | 4,5            |
| Summary Statistics | Avg: 2.92% ( $\sigma = 0.99$ ppts) |                | Avg: 2.10% ( $\sigma = 0.90$ ppts) |                |

42.99% of the forecast error variance. Furthermore, the ERPT acts as the secondary external driver, contributing 10.61%. This confirms a structural vulnerability where external conditions dominate price stability. While domestic monetary policy remains effective, it accounts for a smaller 17.20% of the variation, confirming that BI’s fight for price stability is complicated by external market forces pressing the rupiah.

In contrast, Vietnam exhibits significantly less sensitivity to external factors, supporting its structural shielding hypothesis. Its volatility is notably less sensitive to both global shocks and the exchange rate. The SVAR results indicate that Vietnam’s core inflation is more effectively influenced by domestic monetary policy interest rate movements and domestic demand shocks. This superior insulation allows the SBV to transmit its policy signals with greater autonomy and clarity compared to BI, whose policy effectiveness is often diluted by the necessity of currency defence.

***Impulse response analysis and policy effectiveness***

IRFs from the SVAR model assess the speed, magnitude, and persistence of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in both economies. The results reveal a sharp difference in the timing and clarity of policy effectiveness, driven by the varying degrees of structural insulation.

In Indonesia, the policy transmission process exhibits a notable lag. The anti-inflationary effect of a domestic policy rate hike is initially weak and delayed, with the peak impact on underlying price pressures occurring only between the third and sixth quarters<sup>31</sup> following the initial shock. This delay is consistent with a policy framework operating under a currency constraint. BI is structurally constrained by the persistent threat of rupiah instability, often forcing the central bank to prioritize “currency defence” over solely targeting domestic price stability. This constant need to stabilize the exchange rate dilutes the immediate and timely transmission of policy signals intended for domestic demand management, lengthening the policy lag.


Conversely, Vietnam demonstrates a more direct and faster transmission of monetary policy. Following a policy rate shock, the anti-inflationary effect on core inflation is superior in both speed and clarity, typically peaking within the first two quarters. This superior efficacy stems directly from the stable exchange rate anchor identified in the preceding analysis. This managed currency acts as a structural shield, effectively protecting the core inflation measure from external “noise” and volatility. The result is a clean policy channel where domestic policy signals are transmitted quickly and effectively, allowing the SBV to achieve its desired anti-inflationary impact with minimal delay.

***Out-of-sample forecasting (Q1 2026 – Q4 2030)***

The long-term SVAR forecast confirms the persistence of the observed structural differences in price stability, projecting clear future inflation trajectories.

For Vietnam, the forecast shows Core Inflation centering around its historical trend of approximately 2.5–3.0%, but with a notably narrower forecast uncertainty band ( $\pm 0.8$  ppts). This projection

<sup>31</sup> Bank Indonesia (2026) Economic and Monetary Policy Update. Jakarta: Economic and Monetary Policy Department, Bank Indonesia. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/laporan/Documents/LPI-2025-EN.pdf> (Accessed 11.03.2026).



Source: Researcher's calculations  
Fig. 2. SVAR out-of-sample forecast

strongly confirms a highly stable and predictable long-term underlying inflation environment, suggesting that the “structural shielding” provided by the managed currency regime allows the SBV to maintain strong policy credibility and structural resilience against future shocks.

In sharp contrast, the forecast for Indonesia is structurally higher and exhibits significantly greater volatility, evidenced by a wider ppts uncertainty band. This sustained volatility projection highlights the persistent external vulnerability identified in the variance decomposition. The continued high transmission of the global shock and ERPT effect ensures that even in the long run, Indonesia's core price stability remains substantially more exposed to global financial market turbulence.

#### *Short-term context and synthesis*

The recent inflation figures for early 2025 reveal a distinct and nuanced picture compared to the long-term structural divergence identified by the SVAR model. As of February 2025, Vietnam's core Consumer Price Index stood at a rate that was marginally higher than Indonesia's core Consumer Price Index of 2.48% for the same month. This specific, short-term data point suggests that while Vietnam exhibits lower long-term volatility and a stronger structural defence, it is currently managing slightly higher underlying price pressures than Indonesia. Furthermore, Indonesia's overall headline inflation is expected to remain lower throughout 2025 (forecasting around 2–3%), compared to Vietnam's forecast range of 4–4.5%.

Therefore, despite Indonesia's structural vulnerability to external shocks and currency volatility, its monetary policy has been successful in suppressing current core price levels to be marginally lower than Vietnam's in early 2025, and its overall headline inflation is expected to remain lower throughout the year.

The comprehensive empirical results from the SVAR model – specifically the IRFs and variance decomposition – have fully addressed the research objectives by quantifying the comparative volatility, analysing the speed and magnitude of the policy transmission, and establishing the relative efficacy of the two regimes in stabilizing medium-term price expectations.

### **Discussion**

The contemporary analysis of macroeconomic stability in ESEA necessitates a comparative examination of structurally divergent economies and their heterogeneous monetary policy frameworks. This discussion focuses on the contrasting regimes and economic drivers of Indonesia and Vietnam, utilising a methodological approach designed to isolate the causal mechanisms of core inflation variance.

### ***Context and foundational metrics***

The economic context for this analysis is established by recent comprehensive assessments. The OECD Economic Outlook (2025) projects Indonesia's growth to be driven by robust domestic consumption and strong commodity exports, requiring structural reforms to enhance human capital and the business environment<sup>32</sup>. In stark contrast, the OECD Economic Survey of Vietnam (2025) focuses on assessing the nation's complex transition toward a high-income, innovation-driven economy, with resilience largely dependent on continued FDI and ascension in global value chains<sup>33</sup>. Both reports underscore the critical need for policy coordination to manage the inherent trade-off between growth and price stability within their respective hybrid monetary systems.

Price stability, operationalized as maintaining a low, predictable inflation rate [6, 7], is the core objective. Within this context, core inflation emerges as the preferred operational metric. It deliberately excludes volatile components like food and energy to isolate the persistent, underlying trajectory of price movements linked directly to aggregate demand and monetary policy efficacy [12]. The theoretical linkage between monetary policy and price dynamics is rooted in the NKPC framework, justifying the adoption of the SVAR methodology – specifically its long-run identification restrictions – to provide a causal assessment of policy outcomes by structurally isolating channels responsible for long-run core inflation variance [35, 36].

### ***Structural divergence and policy implications***

The key structural divergence lies in the economic engine and subsequent vulnerability channel. Indonesia's resource-driven economy is particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the global commodity price channel, where increases in raw material prices quickly lead to domestic cost-push pressures on core inflation<sup>34,35</sup>. Conversely, Vietnam's dominant export-orientated manufacturing hub renders its inflation dynamics more vulnerable to the global demand and supply chain channel<sup>36</sup>.

These structural differences manifest in contrasting monetary policy regimes. BI operates a formal ITF, but the persistent threat of rupiah volatility necessitates frequent intervention, confirming the framework's operational function as a hybrid monetary system [21, 29]. This reliance on flexibility acts as a shock absorber but carries the severe risk of a high ERPT effect, rendering core inflation highly sensitive to external factors. In stark contrast, the SBV employs a regime where the stability of the Vietnamese dong exchange rate is prioritized as the primary nominal anchor<sup>37</sup>. This managed regime effectively mitigates the ERPT channel, relying more heavily on administrative measures like credit growth ceilings to constrain aggregate demand [13, 23]. This approach is structurally designed to shield the domestic economy from external price shocks.

### ***Assessment of monetary policy effectiveness***

The empirical results from the SVAR model provide critical insights into the practical applicability of different monetary frameworks for central banks in ESEA. The evaluation of policy effectiveness is empirically determined by the speed and magnitude of the policy transmission mechanism, where the comparative assessment concludes that BI's effectiveness is structurally constrained by currency instability. This volatility often forces the use of policy instruments for “currency defense rather than solely targeting underlying domestic stability”, thereby consuming crucial countercyclical policy

<sup>32</sup> OECD (2025) Tackling Uncertainty, Reviving Growth. *OECD Economic Outlook*, 1, 1–277. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/83363382-en>

<sup>33</sup> OECD (2025) OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/fb37254b-en>

<sup>34</sup> ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (2023) ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2024: Navigating Tomorrow. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29998.22087>

<sup>35</sup> PwC Indonesia Economic Update — First Quarter of 2024. [online] Available: <https://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/general/indonesia-economic-update-2024-q1.pdf> (Accessed 18.02.2026)

<sup>36</sup> Vietnam: Recalibrate Policy Mix to Broaden Economic Recovery [online] Available: <https://amro-asia.org/vietnam-recalibrate-policy-mix-to-broaden-economic-recovery> (Accessed 17.02.2026)

<sup>37</sup> Vietnam Banking Forum 2023 “Monetary Policy in Turbulent Times” — Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam [online] Available: <https://sbv.gov.vn/en/w/vietnam-banking-forum-2023-monetary-policy-in-turbulent-times-> (Accessed 17.02.2026)



space<sup>38,39</sup> [8]. Specifically, the variance decomposition analysis demonstrates that while Indonesia's ITF maintains high domestic effectiveness – explaining 17.20% of core inflation variation – its practical utility is hampered by a 42.99% vulnerability to global shocks. This external pressure creates a significant transmission lag where policy impacts only peak between the third and sixth quarters.

Conversely, the SBV structural controls yield a more stable environment, creating superior countercyclical policy space to manage domestic demand. Vietnam's hybrid system proves its practical value by utilizing core inflation as a structural anchor that effectively insulates the domestic price environment from global volatility, as evidenced by a mean core inflation of only 2.10%. This divergence highlights a significant synthesized regional theme: the diminished resilience of domestic monetary policy against external shocks in the region, where local interest rates often play a minor role in explaining inflation dynamics compared to global factors [11, 26]. For Vietnam, this challenge is complicated by endemic dollarization [4, 5], underscoring the necessity for active structural management to preserve the macro-financial foundation built on a stable Vietnamese dong anchor. Ultimately, these findings offer a clear roadmap for regional policymakers: improving policy effectiveness requires not just internal targeting, but structural reforms aimed at reducing external exchange rate pass-through and deepening domestic financial markets to shorten observed transmission lags.

### Conclusion

The comparative SVAR analysis establishes a fundamental divergence in monetary policy resilience between Vietnam and Indonesia, highlighting a critical trade-off in regime design where Vietnam's structural shielding of core inflation contrasts with Indonesia's enduring currency constraint. The study finds that Vietnam's hybrid monetary system achieves superior insulation by utilizing core inflation as a highly effective anchor, which successfully shields the domestic economy from global shocks and results in a lower mean core inflation of 2.10% alongside a narrower long-term forecast uncertainty band. However, this stability imposes a trade-off under the "Impossible Trinity", as global shocks constrain the central bank's independence and limit its capacity to tailor policy purely for domestic growth needs.

Conversely, Indonesia's ITF demonstrates significant domestic effectiveness – explaining 17.20% of core inflation variation – yet remains overwhelmingly vulnerable to external pressures due to high financial openness and a 10.61% ERPT effect. These factors allow global shocks to account for 42.99% of variance, forcing BI to prioritize rupiah stability and resulting in a transmission lag where anti-inflationary impacts peak only between the third and sixth quarters.

Ultimately, while Vietnam maintains a sustainable price environment at the cost of policy freedom, Indonesia's domestic policy capacity is undermined by external volatility, suggesting that mitigating such structural vulnerability requires reforms aimed at reducing import dependency and deepening domestic financial markets.

<sup>38</sup> Bank Indonesia (2025) Monetary Policy Report — Quarter IV 2025. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/laporan/Documents/MPR-Quarter-I-2025.pdf> (Accessed 11.03.2026).

<sup>39</sup> Hendarta F., Kurniati Y., Juhro S.M. et al. (2023) Indonesia untuk Dunia: Pulih Bersama, Pulih Lebih Kuat [Indonesia for the World: Recover Together, Recover Stronger]. Jakarta: BI Institute, Bank Indonesia. [online] Available: <https://www.bi.go.id/id/bi-institute/publikasi/Pages/Indonesia-untuk-Dunia-Pulih-Bersama-Pulih-Lebih-Kuat.aspx> (Accessed 10.03.2026).

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#### INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS / СВЕДЕНИЯ ОБ АВТОРАХ

**МУЛЬОНО Вирьянта**

E-mail: [wiryantamuljono@gmail.com](mailto:wiryantamuljono@gmail.com)

**Wiryanta MULJONO**

E-mail: [wiryantamuljono@gmail.com](mailto:wiryantamuljono@gmail.com)

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8679-7767>

**СЕТИАВАТИ Шри**

E-mail: srisetiyawati84@gmail.com

**Sri SETIYAWATI**

E-mail: srisetiyawati84@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7330-2371>

**СЕТИАВАТИ Приянка Пертиви**

E-mail: priyankapertiwisetiawati@gmail.com

**Priyanka Pertiwi SETIAWATI**

E-mail: priyankapertiwisetiawati@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0856-8242>

**СЕТЬЯНТО Падманабха Адякса**

E-mail: padmanabhaadyaksasetyanto@gmail.com

**Padmanabha Adyaksa SETYANTO**

E-mail: padmanabhaadyaksasetyanto@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0004-4639-0961>

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